Farm Murders and the ANC: What Does the Historical Evidence Reveal?
US President Donald Trump meets South African President Cyril Ramaphosa in the Oval Office on May 21, 2025. Official White House photo by Daniel Torok.
Historical Allegations, Contested Statistics and Government Accountability Put South Africa’s Rural Safety Record Under Scrutiny
South Africa’s history of rural violence has reopened difficult questions about political incitement, government accountability and whether the country has done enough to protect people living and working on farms.
DURBAN, South Africa — 27 October 2026: South Africa’s farm murder debate has returned to the spotlight following renewed scrutiny of the African National Congress’s (ANC) historical conduct during the liberation struggle, the origins of the controversial “Kill the Boer” chant and the state’s response to attacks on farming communities.
In an article published on 27 October, Newsday reported on historical claims made by James Myburgh, editor of Politicsweb and director of the Bremen Centre for Democratic Research. Speaking on a Sakeliga podcast, Myburgh argued that the ANC’s armed struggle contributed to the emergence of politically motivated attacks against white farmers during the 1980s and that subsequent governments failed to adequately address the threat.
His account raises questions about the relationship between revolutionary politics and rural violence, as well as the extent to which decisions taken before and after the 1994 democratic transition shaped South Africa’s security landscape.
However, the distinction between historical allegations, established events and independently verified evidence remains essential. The seriousness of farm murders demands scrutiny, but claims of political responsibility must be assessed against documentary records, credible historical research and the circumstances of individual crimes.
The historical origins of farm attacks
According to Myburgh, the history of politically motivated attacks against white farming communities can be traced to the armed conflicts of the 1980s, when liberation movements operated within a broader regional environment shaped by wars in neighbouring countries.
He contends that the “Kill the Boer” chant, associated with the Zimbabwe People’s Revolutionary Army during the Rhodesian Bush War, entered the political vocabulary of South African liberation movements through historical links and military training networks.
Myburgh further alleges that ANC military structures encouraged attacks on white farming communities as part of a broader revolutionary strategy. He maintains that these activities included political mobilisation, the designation of certain farmers as targets because of their association with the apartheid-era commando system, and the training of local groups to carry out attacks.
These are substantial allegations. Establishing their full extent requires examining contemporary ANC documents, military records, testimony from participants and independent historical investigations.
The historical context also matters. The liberation struggle unfolded under a system of racial oppression, political exclusion and state violence. Recognising that context does not excuse attacks on civilians, just as documenting abuses committed by liberation movements does not diminish the abuses perpetrated by the apartheid state.
The central historical question is whether specific political directives, military operations and organisational decisions can be reliably connected to particular attacks, rather than treating the existence of a wider armed struggle as proof of responsibility for every subsequent crime.
Did the violence change after 1994?
The transition to democratic government brought an end to apartheid and fundamentally altered South Africa’s political institutions. Yet violent crime remained a serious problem, including in rural areas where isolated properties, long emergency response times, and limited access to security resources can leave residents particularly vulnerable.
Myburgh argues that farm attacks continued to increase during the 1990s, despite the decline in other forms of politically driven violence. He also contends that the ANC government failed to maintain the specialised policing capacity needed to address attacks on farms and smallholdings.
Those claims deserve examination against historical crime figures, changes in policing structures, investigative capacity and the decisions that accompanied the transition to democratic governance.
An earlier study published in SA Crime Quarterly, drawing on research conducted by the Committee of Inquiry into Farm Attacks, found that robbery was the primary motive identified in the cases examined. The research also highlighted the importance of investigative methods in securing convictions.
That finding provides an important counterweight to any attempt to assign a single political motive to farm attacks as a whole. Robbery, interpersonal violence, political hostility, and other circumstances cannot simply be treated as interchangeable explanations.
At the same time, evidence that robbery was a major motive in investigated cases does not establish that political hostility played no role in other incidents. Each allegation requires evidence appropriate to the case.
The government’s responsibility extends beyond debating motive. It includes maintaining effective policing, investigating murders properly, protecting rural residents and ensuring that offenders are brought before the courts.
What do the official statistics tell us?
The reliability and interpretation of farm murder statistics have themselves become part of the political dispute.
In March 2025, the Ministry of Police confirmed that the South African Police Service (SAPS) had begun verifying a list of farm attacks submitted by AfriForum. The organisation had raised concerns that official figures undercounted farm murders, particularly those involving farm owners.
The ministry reported that preliminary verification had identified no additional farm-owner murders beyond the single case already reflected in the relevant quarter’s official figures. It also stated that the verification process was continuing.
The announcement illustrates the importance of reconciling competing datasets before drawing conclusions about the scale of a problem.
In August 2025, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation reported that six murders had occurred in farming communities during the fourth quarter of the 2024/25 financial year, covering January to March 2025. The victims comprised two farmers, three employees and one farm dweller.
The government argued that the figures did not demonstrate a pattern of racially targeted violence. That is the government’s interpretation of the available statistics; the figures alone cannot establish the motive behind every incident or settle broader historical questions.
There is also a distinction between statistics measuring murders, statistics measuring attacks, and datasets that classify victims by occupation or location. These categories should not be conflated when comparing trends over time.
A comprehensive assessment requires transparent definitions, consistent reporting periods, and sufficient information about victims, circumstances, and investigative findings. Without these, competing claims can become political talking points rather than a reliable basis for public policy.
Sources: South African Government — SAPS verification of farm murder statistics; South African Government — International relations and cooperation on farm crime.
The controversy surrounding “Kill the Boer”
The chant remains one of the most contentious symbols in South African politics.
Critics argue that language calling for the killing of a particular group is dangerous, particularly in a country where racial tensions and violent crime remain politically sensitive. Supporters of the chant have argued that it belongs to the historical repertoire of anti-apartheid resistance and should be understood within that context rather than interpreted as a literal instruction to commit murder.
The dispute has also been tested in court.
In May 2024, the Supreme Court of Appeal dismissed AfriForum’s appeal against an Equality Court ruling that the chant, in the circumstances considered by the court, did not constitute hate speech. In March 2025, the Constitutional Court dismissed AfriForum’s application for leave to appeal.
Those decisions established the legal outcome of that particular dispute. They did not establish that every use of the words is harmless, that political rhetoric can never contribute to hostility, or that a connection exists between the chant and any specific farm murder.
Legal classification and political responsibility are different questions. A court ruling on hate speech does not replace the need to investigate credible evidence of incitement or criminal conduct in individual circumstances.
Politicians also have a responsibility to consider the foreseeable consequences of their public language. That responsibility applies across political parties and communities. Condemning rhetoric that appears to celebrate violence need not require denying the historical context in which it emerged.
Government accountability and rural safety
The debate becomes particularly consequential when it moves beyond historical blame to the practical question of whether the state is protecting people effectively.
Myburgh argues that the post-1994 government weakened institutions that had previously played a role in combating attacks on farms. That allegation warrants scrutiny of the changes to specialised police units, rural security structures, investigative resources and the operational consequences of those decisions.
The government, meanwhile, has pointed to its National Rural Safety Strategy and cooperation between police, agricultural organisations, community representatives and private security providers.
In August 2025, the Department of International Relations and Cooperation reported that 893 of 900 identified rural police stations had fully implemented the strategy by the end of the fourth quarter of the 2024/25 financial year.
Implementation figures, however, are not the same as evidence of effectiveness. Assessing the strategy requires examining response times, case-clearance rates, arrests, prosecutions, convictions and whether attacks have declined in the communities covered.
If the government maintains that its rural safety measures are working, it should be able to demonstrate their impact through transparent, comparable data. If critics argue that the state dismantled effective security capacity, they should identify the relevant decisions and establish their consequences with credible evidence.
Neither assertion should be accepted or dismissed solely because it comes from a political ally or opponent.
Beyond political accusations
Farm murders are not an abstract argument about ideology. They involve people killed in their homes or workplaces, families left without loved ones and communities forced to consider whether their homes are safe.
Farm owners are not the only people exposed to rural violence. Employees, farm dwellers and their families also require protection. An effective response must recognise the circumstances of all those affected without diminishing the experiences of any particular group.
The debate over political incitement also requires precision. A violent slogan may be condemned as irresponsible or morally objectionable without automatically establishing that it caused a particular crime. Conversely, the absence of a proven link in one case does not demonstrate that political rhetoric can never contribute to a climate of hostility.
South Africa needs evidence capable of answering these questions rather than competing narratives that leave important details unresolved.
The historical allegations raised by Myburgh warrant examination. So do the government’s explanations of rural crime, the reliability of official statistics and the measurable performance of the institutions responsible for public safety.
Ultimately, accountability should not depend on which political party stands to benefit from the findings. If individuals or organisations encouraged, organised or facilitated criminal violence, credible evidence should be investigated and responsibility established through appropriate legal processes. If government decisions weakened the ability to protect rural communities, those decisions should also be examined.
The public deserves answers that go beyond political rhetoric.
Can South Africa establish, through independently verifiable historical evidence, the extent to which political organisations contributed to farm attacks during the liberation struggle? Are official crime statistics sufficiently transparent to measure the full extent of violence against everyone living and working on farms? And, regardless of political affiliation, what evidence can the government provide that its rural safety policies are protecting communities today?
