Revisiting the 1992 Referendum and Its Consequences
Whereas the passage of time has a tendency to encrust the past with a general historical narrative, it also stimulates critical revision. The significance of the 1992 referendum, its mandate and its consequences provide a case in point.
Historically, that referendum is regarded as having provided a mandate to negotiate a democratic constitutional order. But the terms and conditions to which FW De Klerk acceded on the negotiation path tell a different story.
Power sharing, not majority rule, was De Klerk’s mandate. But once the Multi-Party Negotiating Forum got underway in April 1993, it became clear that a constitutional state could not accommodate power sharing. Any party with a large majority would be under no obligation to dilute its power with a minority party.
As the negotiations proceeded, De Klerk’s team was forced to make one concession after another to the ANC. Cabinet meetings record De Klerk repeatedly insisting on no further concessions. But on one issue after another, in the face of ANC persistence, De Klerk’s cabinet acquiesced. (Hermann Giliomee, The Last Afrikaner Leaders, p. 396). As one adviser conceded, “I saw non-negotiable aspects within minutes become negotiable” (Giliomee, p. 403).
Senior negotiators, Hernus Kriel and Tertius Delport, conceded that overall there was no clear bottom line beyond which there could be no further retreat. Another senior NP minister, Leon Wessels, with hindsight declared that De Klerk misread the situation completely, believing he could retain his authority and share power with Mandela. (Giliomee, p. 397).
Although the ANC had thwarted the idea of power sharing at every level, even as late as 20 February 1994 in ‘Briefing Notes’, the National Party disingenuously claimed power sharing had been accepted. (Giliomee, p. 408).
However, the blunt reality was that De Klerk surrendered power. Of course, within the context of circumstances at the time, which included widespread internal unrest and violence, critical international pressure and sanctions, it has been remarked that De Klerk had little choice.
What also needs to be appreciated is the historical application in Africa of the adage ‘rule or be ruled.’ Liberation movements have never compromised their objectives, and the ANC was no exception.
In the wake of the shambles of 30 years of ANC rule, the pre-1994 misgivings of right-wing whites about majority rule are difficult to dispute. As Dr RW Johnson wrote in How Long Will South Africa Survive? (p.48), they warned that “authoritarianism, corruption and incompetence sufficient to ruin the country” would result.
