Big Banks to Issue Smart IDs and Passports — But Are They Truly “Forgery-Resistant”?

A new partnership between major banks and the South African Department of Home Affairs aims to offer Smart IDs and passports through bank branches. Proponents claim the system will streamline access to vital documents while touting the “forgery-resistant” nature of Smart IDs. But is this really the case? Beneath the surface, several issues demand closer inspection.

The Promise of Smart IDs via Banks
According to a report by BusinessTech, South Africa’s biggest banks will soon serve as conduits for issuing Smart IDs and passports. This initiative is presented as a customer-centric move aimed at reducing congestion at Home Affairs offices and speeding up application processes. Proponents claim these Smart IDs offer enhanced security, with officials asserting that they are “far more resistant to forgery” than older forms of identification.

But is this claim justified? Evidence suggests otherwise. While digitisation may modernise the process, it also introduces vulnerabilities that could undermine security rather than bolster it. Here are 10 counterarguments challenging the narrative that Smart IDs are “forgery-resistant.”

1. Centralisation Increases Risk of Data Breaches
South Africa’s reliance on centralised data systems has exposed critical vulnerabilities, as seen in cyberattacks targeting government departments and financial institutions. Recent breaches have affected entities like the Department of Public Works, which lost over R300 million in a decade, and the Government Pensions Administration Agency, where hackers claimed to have stolen 668 GB of sensitive data. High-profile attacks on Transnet, the Office of the Chief Justice, and the City of Johannesburg further highlight the dangers of centralised IT systems. Experts warn that such breaches leave millions exposed to identity theft, fraud, and exploitation, as personal data sold on the dark web remains valuable for years. TimesLive.

2. Biometric Forgery is a Growing Threat
Unlike traditional ID theft, biometric forgery is harder to detect but not impossible. Recent advancements in 3D printing and AI-driven face-swapping technologies have demonstrated how fingerprints and facial features can be replicated. Criminals with the right tools could circumvent biometric scanners, calling into question the claim that Smart IDs are “forgery-resistant.”

3. Dependency on Corporate Systems
While Home Affairs is a government entity, private banks are profit-driven corporations. Relying on their infrastructure to issue IDs raises questions about the extent to which they control public access to essential services. If banks experience system failures, power outages, or cyberattacks, millions could be left without access to their IDs. ITWeb.

4. Loss of Personal Autonomy Over Identity
When citizens must rely on banks for Smart ID issuance, they cede control over their identification process to private entities. This system creates a dynamic where access to vital public documents depends on private sector rules and systems. Worse still, banks might impose additional conditions, such as requiring customers to open accounts or pay fees for “added convenience.”

5. Increased Surveillance and Technocratic Control
Digital IDs are a core component of the World Economic Forum’s (WEF) push for a global identification system. While branded as “convenience,” these systems also enable mass tracking and monitoring of citizens. If South Africa’s Smart IDs are linked to financial services, every transaction, movement, and purchase may soon be traceable.

6. “Forgery-Resistance” is a Marketing Term, Not a Guarantee
The claim that Smart IDs are “forgery-resistant” sounds reassuring, but similar claims have been made for past “secure” systems that were later compromised. Hackers are often one step ahead of the technology, finding ways to bypass security measures. In reality, no system is foolproof, especially one that is highly centralised and accessible through multiple points.

7. Exclusion of Unbanked Populations
South Africa has around 11 million unbanked citizens, many living in rural areas without access to banking services. By shifting ID services to banks, an entire demographic may be excluded from essential identification documents, worsening inequality. Smart ID issuance through banks risks becoming a privilege rather than a right.

8. Potential Hidden Costs for Users
Currently, Home Affairs issues Smart IDs as a free public service, but only for first-time applicants (like 16-year-olds). If you’re replacing a green ID book, it costs R140. With the process shifting to banks like ABSA, FNB, Nedbank, and Standard Bank, there’s a strong chance that “convenience fees” could follow. Banks might introduce handling fees or impose new conditions, further monetising a once-public service.

9. Reduced Accountability and Oversight
Home Affairs is a government department with public accountability mechanisms. If services shift to banks, the same level of oversight may not apply. Complaints and disputes regarding Smart IDs might be handled under bank policies instead of government regulations, making recourse more difficult for citizens.

10. A Single Point of Failure
When ID systems are centralised within banking institutions a single point of failure is created. If a major bank’s system goes down, South Africans may be unable to access their IDs, impacting everything from travel to accessing government services. The potential for systemic collapse increases the broader societal risk.

While South Africa’s government claims that Smart IDs issued via banks are more “forgery-resistant,” the evidence suggests otherwise. Increased centralisation, corporate control, and the potential for system failures expose the public to greater risks than the narrative suggests. Instead of handing over critical identification services to profit-driven financial institutions, citizens and policymakers should question who benefits most from this arrangement.